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When Only a Lawyer Will Do – Lawyers as a Necessity, not a Luxury, for Juveniles Before 
Waiving Miranda Rights in New Jersey 
Philip J. Cranwell* 
Introduction 
 What child has not made mistakes?  Parents want their children to be safe and to grow up 
into productive members of society.  Powerful, conflicting interests come into play when a child 
becomes the focus of a police investigation.  Society and victims seek justice.  The police seek 
answers.  The accused and their parents seek to avoid being charged or convicted of a crime.   
 Continue to ask yourself:  What if my child was in police custody and accused of a serious 
crime?  What if the police did not have proof, but they had very strong suspicions that your child 
was guilty of a serious crime?  What if the police called you up and told you to come to the police 
station immediately?  What if your child’s wealthy friend was also in custody, and her parents 
immediately summoned a lawyer?  Would you think you needed one too? 
 The importance of parents’ and guardians’ involvement in the juvenile justice system is 
certainly vital, but to leave the decision whether or not to waive a juvenile’s privilege against self-
incrimination up to parents does not satisfy a juvenile’s constitutional rights.   Parents presumably 
are motivated to serve the best interest of their child in such situations.  But a parent may not 
comprehend the legal consequences when deciding with their child whether to waive their legal 
rights.  Juveniles who find themselves facing police interrogation often come from dysfunctional 
homes,1 where the parent or guardian cannot make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., New Jersey City University. 
1 Leiber, M.J., and Stairs, J.M., Race, contexts, and the use of intake diversion, J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND 
DELINQUENCY 36(1):56–86. 
themselves, and thus perpetuate generational failure to avoid incarceration.  When a crime is 
alleged, behavior and judgment can be clouded by emotion.  
There is, however, one actor in the system who can properly counsel an accused juvenile 
whether to talk to police or not.  The Lawyer has the education, experience, objectivity and sworn 
duty to advocate for the rights of those they represent.  Anything less than a requirement that 
juveniles consult with an attorney before being interrogated by police is an unacceptable half-
measure.   
 Our New Jersey courts have recognized there is no substitute for an attorney’s advice in 
deciding whether to answer questions from police.  “Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands 
accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society, as a whole, looks as the protector of the 
legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the courts.”2 
 All juveniles should have a constitutional right to a mandatory consultation with an 
attorney before waiving their Miranda rights.  The U.S. Constitution grants citizens the right 
against self-incrimination.3  The privilege against self-incrimination is a powerful shield against 
government power when police conduct interrogations.4  Still, adults and juveniles alike often 
waive this right at their own peril, without sound legal advice and without fully understanding the 
consequences.5  Other times, waiver is strategic, where the first person who talks to police receives 
leniency, or a promise of a recommendation of leniency, in exchange for information to be used 
 
2 State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1116-17 (N.J. 2000) (emphasis added).     
3 U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ”). 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  The Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment protections to encompass 
any situation outside of the courtroom that involves the curtailment of personal freedom, also known as a custodial 
interrogation.  Id.  So, any time police take a suspect into custody, they must make the suspect aware of his or her 
Miranda rights.  Id.  These rights include the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during 
questioning, and the right to have a government-appointed attorney if the suspect cannot afford one.  Id. 
5 Richard Rogers & Eric Y. Drogin, Miranda Rights and Wrongs: Matters of Justice, CT. REV.: THE J. OF THE AM. 
JUDGES ASS’N. 509, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/509.  
against others.  It is very much debatable whether a juvenile can knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waive this right.6  The system should work to protect the young more than adults when 
faced with the momentous decision to waive their rights.   
 The Legislative Branch and Executive Branch of the federal government are unlikely to 
spend their political capital to enact a law protecting juvenile criminal suspects.  Likewise, the 
majority conservative Supreme Court is not likely to  recognize the right to the consultation.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court is the ultimate forum with the power and best opportunity to protect 
our state’s juveniles, recognizing this consultation as a constitutional right. 
 First, Part I examines the privilege against self-incrimination.  This paper will detail the 
protections provided by the U.S. Constitution, as the Supreme Court has defined the contours of 
the law over time.  Likewise, the paper will discuss New Jersey’s law regarding the right against 
self-incrimination.  A recent New Jersey Supreme Court case, where a pre-Miranda consultation 
with an attorney would have yielded a more just initial result, will be highlighted. 
 Much written material supports this conclusion based on science, specifically related to 
juvenile brain development.  Part II of this paper will examine the recurring themes in this area of 
study, which have been increasingly accepted by courts.   
 Next, Part III will explore why some may argue against a constitutional requirement for a 
pre-Miranda consultation for juveniles.  These include the cost, the potential political pitfalls and 
roadblocks, and possible prosecutorial and law enforcement opposition.   
 Part IV will explore arguments likely to tip the scales toward protecting the young, 
persuading courts to require the consultation.  While the science and social studies are powerful 
 
6 Thomas Grisso,  Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 6, 1134-
66, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3480263. 
on their own, basic principles of justice, equality and fairness can carry the consultation from a 
legal theory to a reality.  A juvenile’s decision to waive or not can carry consequences of such 
great magnitude, that a consultation with a lawyer should be required for all juvenile criminal 
suspects, not just those who can afford it.  This paper will explore the potential positive effect the 
consultation could have on racial disparities that exist in the juvenile justice system.7 
Part I 
 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives a criminal suspect the right to refuse 
"to be a witness against himself."8  The right to remain silent was enshrined for criminal suspects 
by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, ruling that detained criminal suspects must be 
informed of their constitutional right to an attorney and against self-incrimination before police 
begin questioning.9   
 Miranda arose from the 1963 arrest of Ernesto Miranda in Phoenix, AZ, suspected of rape, 
kidnapping, and robbery.10  Police did not inform Miranda of his rights before their two-hour 
interrogation.11  Police extracted a confession from Miranda on video, without counsel present.12  
Miranda had a history of mental instability and an eighth grade education.13  After a trial where 
his confession was the only evidence against him, Miranda was convicted of both rape and 
kidnapping, receiving a sentence of 20 to 30 years in prison.14  The Arizona Supreme Court 
 
7 This paper does not undertake a specific analysis of the New Jersey Constitution, but instead relies on caselaw as to 
the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination, and on public policy. 
8 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
9 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491. 
10 Id. at 491-92. 




rejected his appeal that the police had unconstitutionally obtained his confession, upholding the 
conviction.15 
 But, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Miranda’s confession was inadmissible in his 
trial because police had violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when they failed to inform 
him of his right to an attorney and against self-incrimination.16  The Court found that the right 
against self-incrimination is a fundamental right designed to offset the imbalance in power between 
police and suspects inherent in interrogations, which can lead to false confessions.17  Likewise, the 
right to an attorney is also fundamental because the presence of an attorney can help “eliminate 
the evils in the interrogations process.”18 
 The Court crafted the Miranda warnings.19  Before any questioning, a suspect must be 
warned that he or she has a right to remain silent, that any statement made may be used as evidence 
against him or her, and that he or she has a right to an attorney, either retained or appointed.20  The 
suspect may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently.21  If, however, the suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process 
that he or she wishes to consult with an attorney there can be no questioning.22  The fact that he or 
she may have answered some questions or volunteered some information does not deprive him or 




17 Id. at 467-69. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 479. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
to interrogation.23  Ernesto Miranda’s conviction was reversed because he was not afforded these 
fundamental rights rendering his confession inadmissible.24  
 Miranda strengthened due process protections for adults in the criminal justice system, but 
juvenile criminal justice was an entirely different experience at that time.  In the early 1960’s, 
judges in juvenile court purportedly assumed a role of caretaker for troubled youth whose parents 
were unable or unwilling to control them.25  Unfortunately, in practice, juveniles had no due 
process rights and suffered harsh punishments without any recourse.26   
 A year after Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the right to notice of charges, the 
right to counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the right against 
self-incrimination to juveniles.27  In re Gault, nicknamed “the Magna Carta for juveniles” by Chief 
Justice Earl Warren,28 was the result of a nationwide movement toward protecting the rights of 
juveniles in the criminal justice system.29   
 At fifteen years old, Gerald Gault was sentenced to a six-year term at a “violent, notorious 
youth detention center” for a crime that, if committed by an adult, would have been punished with 
a $50 fine and up to two months in jail.30  Gault allegedly admitted to the judge during an informal 
hearing that he made an obscene phone call.31  He did not have a lawyer.32  He was never told he 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 492. 
25 https://jjie.org/2017/05/15/a-look-back-at-the-juvenile-justice-system-before-there-was-gault/ 
26 Id. 
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
28 Jessica Lahey, The Children Being Denied Due Process, Most states fail to protect minors’ entitlement to counsel, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/05/the-children-being-denied-
due-process/527448/ 
29 Gault, 387 U.S. at 28. 
30  Id. at 29. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
did not have to answer questions from the judge and his parents were unaware he was accused of 
a crime until after he allegedly confessed.33   
 Gault’s parents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by both 
the Superior Court of Arizona and the Arizona Supreme Court.34  With the help of their local 
lawyer and lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Gaults next sought 
relief in the United States Supreme Court.35  The Court agreed to hear the case to determine any 
procedural due process rights of a juvenile criminal defendant.36 
 In their petition to the Court, the Gaults acknowledged the good intent of the early 
movement to reform juvenile justice when juvenile courts were created to protect the young from 
harsh adult sentences and to put an end to juveniles being housed with adult inmates.37  But they 
argued that informal proceedings originally envisioned to apply “kind, wise and fatherly correction 
to wayward youth” too often imposed cruel punishments on a juvenile guilty of a relatively minor 
offense, to hard time in youth detention facilities next to rapists and murderers.38     
 The Court ruled that Gault’s commitment to the youth house was a violation of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments since he had been denied the right to an attorney, had not been formally 
notified of the charges against him, had not been informed of his right against self-incrimination, 
and had not been provided an opportunity to confront his accusers.39  In his opinion, Justice Fortas 
observed that “being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”40   
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 4. 
35 https://jjie.org/2017/05/15/a-look-back-at-the-juvenile-justice-system-before-there-was-gault/ 
36 Gault, 387 U.S. at 2. 
37 Appellants’ Br. 9, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 1966 WL 87719 (U.S.). 
38 Id. at 12. 
39 Gault, 387 U.S. at 28. 
40 Id. 
 As to a juvenile’s right against self-incrimination, the Court advised, “that admissions and 
confessions of juveniles require special caution,”41 and “the greatest care” should be given to 
assure that the juvenile gives these statements voluntarily with full knowledge of his or her rights.42   
 Gault is significant because it established a baseline of protection for juveniles.  The 
outcome in Gault was partially due to the particularly shocking facts of the case.43  And, notably, 
the Court was open to expanding due process rights during their tenure.44  Like any other 
constitutional right, the Court would be called upon again to define its extent or limitations. 
 In Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a juvenile who 
confessed to a murder had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.45   Michael 
C. was almost seventeen years old, with an extensive criminal record, when he was detained by 
police to question him about a murder.46  He was fully advised of his rights under Miranda, and 
asked for his probation officer to be present.47  Police denied his request for his probation officer, 
but offered to get him a lawyer.48  He declined to have an attorney present, instead answering 
detectives’ questions and providing incriminating statements and drawings.49   
 At his murder trial in juvenile court, he moved to suppress his incriminating statements and 
sketches, arguing his request to see his probation officer was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights in actuality.50  The court denied the motion, but the California Supreme Court reversed, 
 
41 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 45. 
42 Id. at 55. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 




49 Id.  
50 Id.  
finding Michael C.’s request for his probation officer to be a per se invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights.51 
 The United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the 
motion to suppress because a probation officer is not in a position to offer the kind of legal advice 
needed to waive one’s Fifth Amendment rights.52  Probation officers’ duty to report wrongdoing 
to law enforcement disqualifies them from protecting a juvenile’s legal interests despite being in 
a position of trust and cooperation.53  Further, the Court rejected the idea that Michael C.’s request 
for his probation officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.54 
 The Court applied the totality of circumstances test to conclude Michael C. voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights.55  The totality of circumstances analysis includes factors such as the 
suspect's criminal history, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of 
detention, whether the police employed unfair tactics to elicit a confession such as sleep 
deprivation, starvation, threats, etc.56   
 More recently, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a juvenile’s age is a 
factor in determining whether the circumstances satisfy Miranda’s custody requirement.57  
According to Miranda, the duty to issue warnings only attach where there has been such a 
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody."58  Courts must examine all the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation in determining whether there was a "formal arrest or 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 719-22. 
53 Id. at 722-23. 
54 Id. at 723-24. 
55 Id. at 725. 
56 Id. 
57 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2011). 
58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491. 
restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest" to determine 
whether an individual was in custody.59 
 The Supreme Court laid out a number of factors to consider in determining whether a 
defendant is in custody, including (1) the language or tone used when initially confronting or later 
questioning the suspect; (2) the physical surroundings or location of the questioning; (3) the 
duration of the interview; (4) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of 
guilt; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual, including whether the officers 
brandished weapons or touched the suspect.60 
 J.D.B. was thirteen years old when a police officer removed him from class and proceeded 
to interrogate him in a conference room in the presence of another officer and two administrators.61  
They questioned J.D.B. for 30 to 45 minutes about some recent neighborhood break-ins.62  J.D.B. 
confessed after the investigator grilled him about his presence in the neighborhood and after the 
assistant principal urged him to tell the truth.63   
 After he confessed, the investigator told J.D.B. that he could refuse to answer questions 
and was free to leave.64  J.D.B. continued to provide details and gave the investigators a written 
statement.65  J.D.B. was charged with breaking and entering and larceny.66  J.D.B. moved to 
suppress his statements and the evidence gathered as a result of those statements, arguing he was 
in custody and should have been given Miranda warnings before he was questioned.67   
 
59 Id. 
60 J.D.B. v North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270-71 (2011). 
61 Id. at 266. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 267. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 268. 
 The trial court ruled that J.D.B. was not in custody and denied the motion to suppress the 
statements and evidence.68   The North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court.69  The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the test for custody 
did not include consideration of the age of an individual subjected to questioning by police.70 
 The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding “[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often 
feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel 
free to leave,” and remanded the case for the state court to determine whether J.D.B. was in 
custody, considering all the circumstances, including J.D.B.’s age at the time.71  According to the 
Court, it is common sense that a child's age would affect how a reasonable person “in the suspect's 
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave."72  
 The law protects people from more than just standard interrogation.  Even though suspects 
can waive their rights and give incriminating statements to police voluntarily, sometimes police 
subject suspects to conditions that become the “functional equivalent” of an interrogation.73  In 
Innis, police arrested the suspect on suspicion of a robbery, but he refused to waive his rights, after 
repeated Miranda warnings.74  During the ride back to the police station, Innis volunteered to show 
police the weapon he hid after they discussed how bad it would be if a student at a nearby school 





71 Id. at 265. 
72 Id. (“Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a 
child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.”). 
73 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 293-94 (1980). 
74 Id. at 294. 
75 Id. at 295. 
but he insisted on showing them where the weapon was because he didn’t want any children to be 
hurt.76 
 The Supreme Court of the U.S. determined that the officers did not know their words and 
actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Innis, and were not the 
functional equivalent of an interrogation.77  The Court concluded that Innis’ rights were not 
violated because the “subtle compulsion” by police did not amount to an interrogation or the 
functional equivalent.78 
 Years later, the Court applied the Innis standard when a suspect made a voluntary statement 
in front of police after initially invoking his right to remain silent.79  In Mauro, the suspect admitted 
killing his son and told investigators where they could find the body before he decided not to say 
more without a lawyer.80  The suspect’s wife asked to speak to him, and the police allowed her to 
do so, but an officer sat in the room and conspicuously recorded the conversation.81  The Court 
concluded that in the absence of “compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct 
questioning,” the suspect’s statement was voluntary and not the result of the functional equivalent 
of an interrogation.82   
 The Fifth Amendment applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.83  
Nevertheless, states protect juveniles’ rights to differing degrees.  Although seventeen states 
provide protections for juveniles in custody that exceed those required federally, the other thirty-
 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 301. 
78 Id. at 303. 
79 Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987). 
80 Id. at 521-22. 
81 Id. at 523. 
82 Id. at 529. 
83 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (noting the right against self-incrimination applies to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
three have no extra statutory or judicially imposed protections for juveniles.84  These states apply 
the totality of the circumstances test from Fare in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s 
statements in a custodial interrogation.85  Most states who provide additional protections do so in 
an age-based scheme, either barring statements for suspects under a certain age or requiring the 
presence of an interested adult.86   
 New Jersey codified the privilege against self-incrimination in N.J.S.A 2A:84A-19.87 
Although the state constitution does not contain a provision similar to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege pre-dates New Jersey’s constitution, through 
common law.88  Furthermore, the privilege is written into the Rules of Evidence.89   
 The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503 to 
grant broader protection than the federal privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has 
adopted the Innis standard, embracing the view that interrogation includes not only direct 
interrogation but also words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. 
 For a suspect’s incriminating statements to law enforcement to be admissible at trial, the 
State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a suspect’s waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.90  The same standard applies to confessions by  juveniles.91  New Jersey 
 
84 Hana M. Sahdev, Juvenile Miranda Waivers and Wrongful Convictions, 20:5 U. PA. J. C. L. 1211, 1225 n. 112 
(2018) (discussing the various approaches taken to address the voluntariness of statements made by juveniles across 
the nation).  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1225-26. 
87 N.J.S.A 2A:84A-19 (“[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to a police officer or 
other official any matter that will incriminate him . . . .”).  
88 State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 454 (N.J. 2007) (“New Jersey’s privilege against self-incrimination is so venerated 
and deeply rooted in this state’s common law that it has been deemed unnecessary to include the privilege in our State 
Constitution.”). 
89 N.J.R.E. 503. 
90 O’Neill, 936 A.2d at 449 n.12. 
91 State in Interest of A.S., 999 A.2d 1136, 1145 (N.J. 2010). 
courts apply a totality of the circumstances test to gauge the voluntariness of a suspect’s 
incriminating statement to police.92 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles should receive extra 
protections, particularly in custodial interrogations.93  In State in Interest of S.H., the Court 
observed that a juvenile is especially vulnerable to police interrogation without a parent present.94 
The Court instructed, “whenever possible and especially in the case of young children, no child 
should be interviewed except in the presence of his parents or guardian.”95 
 Later, the New Jersey Supreme Court built on the principle from S.H. that parents play in 
indispensable role during the critical stage of custodial interrogation. Presha was the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s seminal case defining juveniles’ privilege against self-incrimination.96  Presha 
reflected the evolution of the juvenile justice system from a system that was primarily 
rehabilitative, correcting “errant” behavior, into a system where punishment was increasingly 
important,.97   
 Presha arose from a violent burglary in an elderly couple’s home, leaving the victims with 
their throats slashed.98  Police located and transported the juvenile suspect and his mother to the 
police station.99  Police informed the suspect of his rights in the presence of his mother in 
 
92 Id. (citing Fare). 
93 State in Interest of S.H., 293 A.2d 181 (N.J. 1972). 
94 Id. at 184. 
95 Id. 
96 State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108 (N.J. 2000). 
97 Id. at 1113 (discussing society’s demand that juvenile crime problems required a more punitive approach to deter 
it).  
98 Id. at 1111. 
99 Id. 
compliance with the law.100 The juvenile suspect was nearly 17 at time of his arrest, he had been 
arrested on 15 prior occasions.101   
 After the suspect’s mother witnessed the signing of the Miranda card, the suspect requested 
that she leave the interrogation room and she agreed.102  Over the course of the next few hours, 
officers successfully interrogated the suspect, extracting a full confession.103  The police were 
careful to document their activities and treatment of the suspect, taking breaks for water and the 
restroom as needed.104  However, sometime during the interrogation, the mother requested and 
was denied the opportunity to again speak to her son and tell him he needed a lawyer.105 
 Applying a totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court determined that the suspect’s 
incriminating statements were voluntary.106  The suspect’s age and criminal history, his mother’s 
presence at the outset, as well as the satisfactory conduct of the police during the interrogation 
informed their decision.107  Nevertheless, the Court recognized the importance of procedural 
safeguards unique to juveniles and their parents.108   
 The Court held that “special circumstances” apply if there is custodial questioning of 
juveniles younger than fourteen outside the presence of their parents.109  When a parent or legal 
guardian is absent from an interrogation involving a juvenile under the age of fourteen, any 





103 Id. at 1112 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1115. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1112–15. 
109 Id. at 1110. 
unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable.110  If an adult is unavailable or 
declines to participate in the interrogation, the police must question the juvenile “with the utmost 
fairness and in accordance with the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness.”111  
A parent or guardian’s absence is a highly significant factor among all other facts and 
circumstances, carrying added weight when balancing it against all other factors in determining 
the voluntariness of a confession.112 
 The Court envisioned the parent or guardian in the context of a juvenile interrogation “as 
advisor to the juvenile, someone who can offer a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting of 
the police station.”113  The support of a parent, however, is not enough to protect a child from the 
full power of the government when faced with the decision to answer questions by police.  Parents 
are not on equal footing with police when their child is a criminal suspect.  Parents are unable to 
recognize unfair coercion or improper conduct. 
 A recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision, State in the Interest of A.A.,114 highlights the 
need for bold change to the law to ensure the fair administration of justice when juveniles are 
subject to custodial interrogation by requiring a consultation with an attorney before waiving their 
rights.115  On a midsummer night in Jersey City, NJ, police officers on patrol observed three black 
males on bicycles ride past, and moments later, the officers heard 8-10 gunshots ring out into the 
 
110 Id. (“Whenever possible, and especially in the case of young children, no child should be interviewed except in the 
presence of his parents or guardian.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1115.  
113 Id. at 1114. 
114 State in Interest of A.A., 222 A.3d 681 (N.J. 2020). 
115 Zoom interview of Laura Cohen, the Director of the Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic at Rutgers Law School.  
Professor Cohen spearheaded the amicus brief before the New Jersey Supreme Court in A.A. and continues in her 
commitment to juvenile justice reform. 
air.116  The officers radioed to dispatch a report along with a description of the three males on 
bikes.  Two victims were found with gunshot wounds to their legs.117  
 Later, a detective detained two people on bikes matching the officers’ description.  Another 
officer who initially responded to the scene positively identified them as the suspects he witnessed 
on bikes before the shooting.118  A search did not find any weapons, ammunition, or gunpowder 
residue on the two suspects.119  Shell casings and one projectile were recovered at the crime scene.  
One of the suspects was fifteen-year-old A.A., who the officers recognized from prior encounters 
in the area for curfew violations.120 
 A.A. was taken into custody and put into a juvenile holding cell, awaiting the arrival of his 
mother.121  When his mother arrived, the police explained why A.A. was arrested, and allowed her 
to speak to her son through the gate of the holding cell.122  With several officers nearby, A.A. 
admitted to his mother that he had been on Wilkinson Avenue, adding, “they jumped us last 
week.”123  Investigators concluded they no longer needed to interrogate A.A. since he admitted his 
presence at the crime scene and provided a motive, within earshot of detectives.124   
 Immediately afterwards, detectives explained to A.A.’s mother that he was being detained 
and she was free to leave.125 At no time was A.A. questioned or advised of his Miranda rights.126    
A.A. was charged with two counts of attempted murder, possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
 











purpose, unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a firearm by a minor.127  He was 
adjudicated delinquent on two counts of second-degree aggravated assault – lesser-included 
offenses of attempted murder – and all three weapons charges.128  The family judge relied heavily 
on A.A.’s admission to his mother.129  He was sentenced to two years confinement.130   
 On January 15, 2020, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division 
in reversing A.A.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication because police violated A.A.’s right against 
self-incrimination.131  The Court found that police improperly failed to issue Miranda warnings 
before allowing  A.A., to speak to his mother,132 and used his incriminating statements as evidence 
at his delinquency hearing.133  The Court concluded that the family court judge should not have 
admitted the statements because the police, in effect, used the mother to interrogate him, in 
violation of the Innis standard.134 
 When the Court granted the State's petition for certification, it also granted the American 
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amici curiae.135  The ACLU argued children require 
more robust protections than adults during custodial interrogations and the Court should require 
consultation with counsel before a juvenile may waive his or her Miranda rights. 136   The ACDL 
asserted that parents and juveniles should have a meaningful opportunity to consult in private 
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before a juvenile is asked to waive his or her Miranda rights.137  Ultimately, the Court declined to 
discuss the ACLU’s proposal to require consultation with a lawyer because the appellant did not 
raise the same arguments on his own.138  
 The Court’s holding sought to prevent similar situations from occurring in the future, by 
instructing police to advise juveniles in custody of their Miranda rights – in the presence of a 
parent or legal guardian – before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile.139  The  
Court further advised police to allow a parent and juvenile to consult in private to decide whether 
to waive those rights.140  Failure to adhere to this guidance would “weigh heavily” in a court’s 
totality of the circumstances analysis of the voluntariness of the waiver of Miranda.141    
 Before A.A. confessed to his mother in front of the police, strong evidence proving he 
committed a crime did not exist.142  An attorney would have almost certainly advised A.A. not to 
say anything to anyone, possibly sparing him from being charged.  Or, perhaps a lawyer would 
have negotiated a cooperation agreement, sparing him from jail time.   We will never know. 
 A mandatory consultation with an attorney before waiver would ensure a fair and just 
system of law and order, protecting the rights of the accused as it administers justice.  Conversely, 
a system that allows the State to cut corners imperils the liberty of the guilty and innocent alike.   
 Presha assumes that the presence of a parent or “interested adult” acts as a buffer against 
police coercion or over-reaching during juvenile interrogations.143   For the reasons that will be set 
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legal protection juvenile suspects often need.   The A.A. court’s holding, that requires issuance of 
Miranda warnings before parents consult with a juvenile in custody, serves more to merely check 
a procedural box for the State than to offer a robust protection for juveniles.  This is so because 
police still can unfairly exploit a post-Miranda waiver and interrogation to unfairly reap 
confessions or other incriminating statements.  Evidence shows juveniles are still more susceptible 
to police interrogations and more likely to falsely confess, despite the presence of a parent.144    
 When police comply with A.A., juveniles will have the appearance of Constitutional 
protection, even if a parent mistakenly allows them to waive their right against self-incrimination.  
It is reasonable to assume that some less scrupulous police will still manipulate and elicit 
incriminating statements from naïve, inexperienced juveniles, albeit after they have waived their 
rights.  New Jersey can and should do better, by requiring the counsel of an attorney before a 
juvenile waives his or her rights. 
Part II 
 Scientific and legal scholarly work demonstrate that children require stronger protections 
than adults in custodial interrogations.  Juveniles lack the maturity and agency to make decisions 
that might have long term consequences.  Interrogations are consequential events that juveniles  
are not equipped to fully comprehend.  New Jersey’s self-incrimination policies should account 
for these vulnerabilities by requiring counsel for juveniles who are subject to custodial 
interrogation.  
 Juveniles are less able to intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights than 
adults.  First of all, studies show juveniles are not likely to understand Miranda warnings.  
“Miranda warnings provide a choice, but a choice based on misunderstanding the options is not 
 
144 Id. 
an ‘intelligent” choice.’”145  Annually, ninety percent of juveniles who are read their Miranda 
warnings waive their rights, which is significantly higher than adults.146  Studies consistently show 
that the vast majority of juveniles do not comprehend all or part of the Miranda warnings.147 
 A juvenile’s inability to understand Miranda is often rooted in reading or oral 
comprehension deficiencies.148  Significant percentages of juvenile offenders have undiagnosed 
learning disabilities requiring special education, or resulting from drug problems or mental 
illness.149  Systemic influences beyond a child’s control also play an important role in a his or her 
comprehension, such as educational quality, poverty and family life.150 
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 Even if a juvenile understands the Miranda warnings, the decision to waive or not to waive 
is likely to be beyond a juvenile’s decision-making capacity.  The juvenile brain is not sufficiently 
developed to make such a momentous decision.151  Laurence Steinberg, a respected expert in 
juvenile neuroscience, has found that the adolescent brain lacks the neural connections within the 
prefrontal cortex, the area of the brain responsible for impulsivity, risk assessment, planning, and 
susceptibility to outside influences.152  In other words, the same characteristics of immaturity that 
lead some juveniles to commit crimes, prevent juveniles from making wise decisions whether to 
submit to custodial interrogation.   
 This area of the brain continues to develop into the twenties,153 so it follows that even a 
seventeen-year-old suspect deserves the same procedural protections as younger suspects.  A 
juvenile’s susceptibility to outside influence supports the idea that a minor might waive his or her 
rights, driven by a desire to please police or even a parent, possibly in direct conflict with his long-
term legal interests.154  This weakness inherent in adolescents supports the argument that 
representation by a defense lawyer is the best, fairest and most logical solution to the issue. 
 Juveniles are more vulnerable than adults to standard interrogation methods, which leads 
to false confessions.  Waiving Miranda rights subjects juveniles to coercive police questioning. 
“Immaturity, inexperience, and lower verbal competence than adults render youths especially 
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vulnerable to police interrogation tactics.”155  In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court determined 
that juveniles cannot be held to the same standards as adults in Miranda situations.156  J.D.B. 
marked an acceptance that there need to be special protections for juveniles regarding confessions 
and custodial interrogations.157  According to Justice Sotomayor, “[N]o matter how sophisticated, 
a juvenile subject to police interrogation ‘cannot be compared’ to an adult subject.”158  Although 
the Court acknowledged this vulnerability, J.D.B. sidestepped the issue of “ineffectiveness 
of Miranda warnings when directed at children.”159 
 Juveniles’ vulnerability to standard police interrogation practices produces false 
confessions in an alarming number of cases.  According to the National Registry of Exonerations, 
from 1998 to 2013, 38 percent of exonerations for crimes alleged to have been committed by youth 
involved false confessions, compared to just 11 percent for adults.160   
 Standard interrogation tactics including coercion, false promises of leniency and deception 
about evidence are particularly effective when employed on minors because they are designed to 
be used against experienced criminals.161  In fact, experts say the imbalance of power in juvenile 
interrogations is so great that it makes the practice questionable because police can too easily break 
down a juvenile’s defenses, producing false confessions.162 
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 Knowing that police employ standard tactics to manipulate people into confessions and 
knowing they are trained in advanced interrogation techniques to accomplish their mission,  
juveniles, and even their parents, are woefully under-matched when police bend the rules.163  A 
requirement for juveniles to consult with counsel before waiving their rights is the logical and just 
solution to fill gaps in the law, where parents simply fall short, through no fault of their own. 
 Police can create an environment they know is likely to produce incriminating statements, 
just as they did in A.A., and a parent may not perceive the legal reality of the circumstances.  A.A.’s 
mother, his natural authority figure, was unwittingly thrust by the police into the role of 
interrogator, and both parent and child were unaware of just how unfair the process was.164  It was 
a lawyer who ultimately recognized the injustice they were subjected to by the police, whether the 
police acted intentionally or not.  It was a lawyer who waged a years-long battle in the appellate 
courts on A.A.’s behalf.  Had the law required A.A. and his mother to consult with an attorney 
before anything else, the outcome would have been more just – even if he was adjudicated 
delinquent for the exact same crimes.  
 Unethical situational manipulations by police have drawn the ire of legal scholars.165  Some 
police are trained to use parents as a tool to extract information from juveniles by intentionally 
increasing the parents’ anxiety, or pressuring parents to encourage the child to confess after 
keeping them apart from children.166 
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 Even private consultation between parent and child, as A.A. requires, is insufficient to 
protect children’s legal rights.  In Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court held that children “need the 
guiding hand of counsel” throughout their entire journey through the juvenile justice system.167  
Notably, the Court also acknowledged children’s unique vulnerability to police questioning and 
signaled a strong preference for the presence of counsel during interrogations.168  Despite the 
mountain of scientific evidence and data, coupled with courts’ strong words and professed 
commitment to protecting juveniles’ rights, courts have yet to recognize juveniles’ right to a 
mandatory consultation before waiving their right to remain silent.   
Part III 
 Implementation of these procedures will not come cheaply.  The cost of providing legal 
counsel to juveniles will certainly be significant, that much is undeniable.  Justice should not be 
assigned a price tag, and Appellate Division articulated this principle in the context of 
administrative hearings that adjudicate parental abuse and neglect.169   In New Jersey Dep't of 
Children & Families v. L.O., the Court held that the right to counsel attaches for indigent 
defendants facing termination of their parental rights because the consequences were of “sufficient 
magnitude” in the context of administrative hearings and appeals for child-abuse.170  The State Bar 
argued against the appellant and the ACLU in L.O., pointing to the cost of providing counsel.171  
The Court determined counsel was required but declined to solve the cost problem, noting “that 
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the Legislature has in the past ‘acted responsibly’ in providing counsel for the poor when 
constitutionally required.”172  The Court quoted the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. 
Illinois, “there is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to 
defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate 
review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.”173  Furthermore, the 
Appellate Division concluded the existence of a right to counsel does not turn on a “cost 
analysis.”174 
 When considering the potential cost of providing counsel for juveniles in custodial 
interrogation, context is important.  The cost of incarceration of juveniles in New Jersey is nearly 
$200,000 annually for each young person.175  As of 2014, New Jersey spent more per young person 
each year than thirty-seven other states.176  The cost of ensuring that juveniles’ rights are protected 
may not be calculable, but in view of the staggering amount the State currently pays to punish 
them, the cost is likely to be offset by reducing the number of juvenile suspects who become 
inmates.  In light of the rate of false confessions, the cost of providing an attorney early in the 
process would likely reduce the cost to the state and judiciary of later legal challenges and appeals. 
 Some may argue a law requiring consultation is politically impossible because the political 
climate is too divided.  When the NJ Legislature passed its latest round of juvenile justice reform, 
it came to reality through a process of political compromise.177  These reforms showed the 
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Legislature has the ability to create effective reforms without producing watered-down, 
meaningless laws that only pay lip service to problems.  On the federal level, The First Step Act, 
which contained major criminal justice reforms, was signed into law during a Presidency and era 
marked by civil unrest and fierce division.178   
 The Legislature is faced with countless issues and powerful forces exerting their influence 
to compete for the State’s resources.  Juvenile criminal suspects are unlikely to wield much 
influence around the Statehouse, so the Supreme Court would more likely be the impetus to require 
counsel for juveniles facing custodial interrogation.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has a strong 
tradition of protecting constitutional rights and the most vulnerable members of the State.   
 Police and prosecutors may not like the idea of providing counsel early in the process.  
Police and prosecutors want to preserve the status quo.  After all, there is not much better evidence 
for proving crimes than confessions.  Police who regularly come into contact with juvenile 
offenders believe such a requirement could unfairly delay investigators, embolden criminals, and 
take away an indispensable tool from their crime-fighting resources.179   
 According to a detective in NJ, experienced in juvenile investigations, well-trained juvenile 
investigators fully understand the stakes when they “Mirandize” and interrogate a juvenile.180  
Although “old school” cops may cut corners, modern, sophisticated interrogators rely on 
documentation, video and audio recording, and strict adherence to protocol when they question 
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juveniles.181  This entails a careful explanation of Miranda rights in the presence of a parent or 
guardian as a first step, making sure each and every word is understood.182  Conscientious law 
enforcement officers attend cutting edge seminars where they learn how to employ advanced 
interrogation techniques adhering to the latest legal standards.183 
 In their eyes, police can sometimes effectively gather valuable information from juveniles 
to quickly solve crimes in the communities they serve.184  Police believe mandatory consultation 
with an attorney before permitting questioning would needlessly slow down the process, allowing 
the trail to go cold on important investigations.185   
 Experienced law enforcement officers believe each case is fact specific, and there cannot 
be a one-size-fits-all approach to juvenile suspects.186  The intensity of an investigation is relative 
to the seriousness of the crime committed, and juveniles do commit very serious crimes.187  
 In Essex County particularly, car theft syndicates utilize juveniles.188  The geography, 
infrastructure and demographics put valuable targets in close proximity to juvenile car thieves and 
violent carjackers who can quickly sell, hide and ship stolen vehicles without capture.189  From an  
investigator’s viewpoint, police would rarely be able to extract confessions and useful information 
from juvenile suspects because lawyers would usually advise them to say nothing.190  In this 












juveniles generally, because it effectively protects the adult leaders who exploit juvenile car 
thieves in the first place.191 
 Police fear such a requirement could embolden juvenile criminals who are more 
experienced in criminal activity.192   In their eyes,  such a requirement would risk decreasing public 
safety because they would be forced to release more juvenile criminals due to a lack of evidence.193   
The detective interviewed considers that an unfair advantage to guilty juveniles, and a limitation 
on the police’s ability to do more than transport suspects to a meeting between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys.194  It is an interesting proposition to consider whether law enforcement would 
respond to a mandatory consultation with an attorney for juvenile defendants by also mandating 
the presence of a prosecutor with the authority to make deals in exchange for information. 
 Notably, when asked if, as a parent, he would want a lawyer if his child was wanted for 
questioning about a serious crime, the same police detective answered, “I would want a lawyer.”195  
Nevertheless, law enforcement’s perspective is important to consider because society relies on the 
protection of the criminal justice system.  After all, juveniles do commit crimes and society 
demands an efficient system of law and order.  
 After viewing the scientific evidence that courts have begun to accept and the arguments 
that weigh against recognizing a right to counsel before waiver, it is important not to overlook 
additional considerations that could tip the scales in either direction.  Fundamental principles of 
fairness and justice favor protecting juveniles’ rights. 
  
 







 Presha envisioned parents as the “buffer” between their child and the police, effectively 
advising and protecting the juvenile’s rights.196  Unfortunately, most parents cannot fulfill this role 
because they lack legal knowledge, or, their vision of “doing the right thing” conflicts with the 
legal interests of the juvenile suspect.197  In other instances, some parents lack the intellectual 
ability or education to understand Miranda.198  Even an intelligent, high-functioning parent is 
unlikely to be aware of the complexities of the law without a legal education and experience in 
criminal defense. 
 Furthermore, the consequences of waiver can subject a juvenile to experiences so extreme 
they justify a requirement of counsel beforehand.  In view of young people’s special status in our 
society, it is important to protect them because their future could be ruined by the very decision to 
answer investigators’ questions.  From a juvenile criminal defendant’s financial perspective, it is 
notable that courts have commanded representation for those who cannot afford it in other legal 
situations where consequences of magnitude existed.199  A lack of wealth should not subject one 
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to an inferior experience in the context of a custodial interrogation in a juvenile criminal matter.200  
The fact that a wealthy parent of a juvenile suspect would not hesitate to hire a lawyer before 
waiving their rights suggests the same kind of consultation should be mandatory for all juvenile 
criminal suspects. 
 It is already settled law that juveniles have the right to an attorney, and one will be 
appointed if they cannot afford one.201  However, a consultation at the critical stage of a custodial 
interrogation is elusive for too many juveniles.  Many minors ill-advisedly waive their right to 
counsel at exactly this stage.  In some jurisdictions, as many as 80 to 90 percent of youth waive 
their right to an attorney because they do not know the meaning of the word “waive” or understand 
its consequences.202  This phenomenon has a “disproportionately large effect on youth from poor, 
minority, immigrant and single-parent families.”203  In effect, juvenile suspects who cannot afford 
a lawyer often suffer consequences of great magnitude in a custodial interrogation by going it 
alone or relying on the advice of parents, while more financially endowed peers enjoy the services 
of a paid criminal defense attorney at the same critical juncture.  This unfortunate outcome should 
be mitigated by requiring a consultation with an attorney to truly uphold the promises of Gault and 
Presha.  After all, in the criminal setting, lawyers are “necessities, not luxuries.”204   
 The prospect of being charged as an adult and serving a term in adult prison justifies 
enhanced protections.  New Jersey has enacted legislation to protect juveniles’ rights, but waiver 
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to adult court and a potential term in adult prison remain real and serious potential consequences 
that justify enhanced protections against self-incrimination for juveniles.205   
 The specter of recidivism is a consequence for minors and society alike.  Despite legislative 
efforts to improve outcomes for juvenile offenders,206 it is unquestionable that some juveniles 
become trapped in the system and go on to a life of crime as adults.207  Nearly eighty percent of 
youth imprisoned in NJ will reoffend within three years, and one-third will be imprisoned again.208  
Worse yet, children in youth detention are more likely to be imprisoned and to live in poverty as 
adults.209  For a juvenile defendant, the best reforms would be reforms that prevent criminal 
charges to begin with.  Legal representation before interrogation would help ensure that only 
juvenile criminal cases with sufficient merit make it past the police station. 
 Racial disparities exist that support the need to provide enhanced protections for juvenile 
criminal suspects.210  Despite being only fourteen percent of the population, black youth make up 
seventy-four percent of the juvenile inmates in NJ.211  A requirement for consultation with a lawyer 
before deciding to answer questions would overwhelmingly benefit black youth because they 
comprise the majority of juveniles in custody.212  Consultation with an attorney before waiver 
would benefit juveniles because it would allow defense counsel to become familiar with their 
clients earlier and give them a chance to gather information while it is still fresh in the defendant’s 
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memory.213  In turn, a vigorous and zealous defense early in the case could prevent unnecessary 
pretrial detention, which more often leads to post-trial imprisonment.214  Criminal defense lawyers 
occupy a unique position in society, and their presence at interrogations would prevent some 
juvenile suspects being caught in the system.  Such a policy would also help build marginalized 
communities’ confidence in a system in which they currently have little faith.215 
Conclusion 
 A juvenile’s entire future success or failure in life could hinge on the decision whether or 
not to answer questions from an investigator.  The legal calculus to make that decision is too 
complex for parents and juveniles alone and is best suited for a lawyer.  In order to keep the 
promises of Gault and Presha, the right to consult with a defense attorney before waiving the right 
to remain silent must be recognized for juveniles in police custody.  Only a lawyer can objectively 
protect the legal interests of a juvenile facing custodial interrogation.  
 
213 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, ACCESS TO COUNSEL, (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204063.pdf. 
214 Id. 
215 Nahgol Ghandoosh, How Defense Attorneys Can Eliminate Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice, THE CHAMPION, 
June 2018, at 36-47, https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/How-Defense-Attorneys-Can-
Eliminate-Racial-Disparities-in-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf. 
